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7 MAR 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Machinery of Takeover

1. Action: None; for your information only.

2. Background: Several weeks ago you requested that we examine how political change in several key Third World countries might occur. Specifically, you were concerned about the machinery of takeover in countries like the Philippines [redacted]. I have attached reports we have now completed [redacted] in addition to one on Pakistan. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Robert M. Gates

Attachment:
As Stated

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The Philippines: Scenarios for Dramatic ChangeSummary

The Marcos regime has been severely weakened during the past year. A further escalation of political protest or deterioration in the President's health could induce Chief of Staff General Ver or others around Marcos to take over the reins of government. More dramatic change--a coup by other generals or senior officers, or, in the longer term, a seizure of power by the Communist Party of the Philippines--also is conceivable. While certain elements in the military, if they seized control, might turn power over to political moderates, we do not believe the moderates have the ability to triumph on their own in a situation of political chaos. [REDACTED]

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The Present Scene

Indications of serious instability have increased substantially since the assassination of Benigno Aquino last August. Politically, the breach between the Marcos regime and the majority of Filipinos is deep and probably irreversible. Disaffection within the business community, the middle class, and labor, and--to a lesser degree--dissension within Marcos's ruling party are making it increasingly difficult for the President to govern effectively. Public perceptions that his health is bad add to the uncertainty. The process of polarization between left and right and the erosion of the middle is now well under way. These political woes are further compounded by a major economic

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crisis, Marcos's health and the succession problem, and the prospect of future turmoil. Economic conditions will not improve appreciably for at least a year; in the meantime, additional price increases and increased unemployment will further heighten opposition to Marcos's rule. [REDACTED]

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Groups Potentially Able to Seize Power

Only two nationwide organizations --the military and, over the longer term, the Communists-- have the potential to challenge Marcos's rule. The Roman Catholic Church does not have the machinery or a program for taking over the government, but could act as a catalyst for these other groups by stepping up its criticism of Marcos. The moderate opposition is fragmented, poorly organized, and has been kept off balance for many years by Marcos's political manipulation and deliberate weakening of democratic institutions; it has little potential for ousting Marcos despite some public support. Like the Church, though, it could play a role in further undermining Marcos and unwittingly assist a seizure of power by the military or Communists who are far better organized. [REDACTED]

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As in other potentially unstable non-Communist countries, any open withdrawal of US support from the regime would be a critical blow to its ability to survive. Such an action, whether before or after Marcos goes, would provide strong encouragement to the regime's adversaries. [REDACTED]

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The military, the Communists, and the Church differ substantially from their counterparts in Iran in 1978-79. Currently subservient to Marcos because of their confluence of

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interests, the military (or faction of it) could move quickly against him if it felt its prerogatives or the security of the country was threatened. The Communist Party is stronger and better positioned than the Tudeh Party because of its infiltration of legitimate opposition groups and the ongoing insurgency. Unlike Shi'ite Islam, the Church firmly believes in the separation of church and state and seeks reform, not revolutionary change. [REDACTED]

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I. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

The AFP's motivation to act politically has been heightened by the martial law period, during which time Marcos extended the AFP's mandate by giving it political and administrative functions, thus broadening its perception of its legitimate role in national affairs. Moreover, Marcos has given the AFP a major economic stake in the way the country is governed. In addition to their civic and military roles, many senior officers have acquired lucrative business ventures. Even junior officers are permitted to conduct economic activities over and above their military duties. [REDACTED]

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Senior general officers have the means to take over the government as a function of their direct control over operational units. After the establishment of martial law, the size of the military tripled from 55,000 to over 156,000 in 1983. During the martial law period, too, Marcos assiduously developed a loyal officer corps--many of them, like Marcos, Ilocanos from central Luzon. AFP chief General Fabian Ver, a long time protege and confidant of Marcos, has appointed a loyal retinue of senior AFP

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officers to command positions in and around the greater Manila and central Luzon area. Any military faction seeking to mount a takeover attempt would need to construct a reliable base of support among this group of officers and the units they command.

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The above said, we believe a military seizure of power could take any one of the following forms:

- o a coup by a unified high command
- o a coup by a faction within the high command acting either independently or preemptively.

- o a coup by a coalition of senior and junior officers acting conspiratorially without the knowledge of senior generals.

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The Scenarios: A move by the senior AFP generals to take over the government while Marcos remains in office could come about if Marcos called upon them to do so or their present

confluence of political and economic interests were to disintegrate. At present, the AFP's negative public reputation, acquired during the martial law years, its ongoing legacy of human rights abuses in the countryside, and its current embarrassment at being accused of complicity in the Aquino murder will make it extremely reluctant to conspire to oust Marcos. The AFP might well move in unison to seize power, however, if Marcos's economic policies directly undercut the vested interests of senior officers, serious violence erupts in the cities, or the President's health deteriorates to a point where he is no longer capable of exerting control over the government. [REDACTED]

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Another potential coup scenario could stem from infighting within senior AFP general officer ranks. Rivalry between Chief of Staff Ver and his deputy General Ramos, for example, has long been a feature of the AFP scene. Heightened dissension between the two over a gut issue such as the adverse consequences of Marcos's policies for the future of the Philippines could lead either general to consider mounting a coup or a counter coup. A coup attempt by General Ramos, however, would fail unless he was able beforehand to win over sufficient senior officers in charge of operational units to form an effective coup machinery. [REDACTED]

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Should Marcos die or be removed from office, the prospects for a military seizure of power would be heightened because of the lack of a publicly accepted succession mechanism and strong public institutions. The military also might move to take over power in the following circumstances:

- o the appointment of a new president from the current

ruling elite on the basis of existing constitutional provisions, results in a weak, divided, and unpopular government incapable of maintaining stability, protecting military interests, or preventing further Communist gains.

o The election of a moderate opposition politician as president which, while undercutting the appeal of the Communists at first, eventually leads to a fragmented political system unable to cope with the country's underlying political and economic problems.

o A dynastic succession from Marcos to his wife Imelda, results in major opposition from the business community and other key interest groups, and then to massive popular unrest.

o There occurs a breakdown of authority in urban areas including massive demonstrations unable to be quelled by government concessions. []

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We do not believe that a seizure of power by the current Filipino military high command would result in major changes in current pro-US policies, including the status of US bases in the Philippines. They would, however, feel a need to reexamine the defense relationship. A seizure of power by middle grade or junior officers, who may be more nationalistic than the present older generation, could lead to demands for a higher level of US assistance plus concessions regarding use of the bases. []

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A further twist to a military takeover is the possibility that General Ramos or other coup plotters, if successful, might establish a new constituent assembly or call upon selected political or other civilian leaders to form a new government. []

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Indicators of Developing Scenarios

o Perceptions by senior military leaders that Marcos is losing his grip on power or that government policies or inaction are threatening the unity and interests of the military.

o Growing sentiment in the AFP that the military is the only group able to run the government and save the country from Communism.

o Disenchantment by senior regional commanders over the failure of the Marcos regime to deal with the NPA's rural insurgency because of Marcos's preoccupation with events in Manila.

o A rise in the number of defections by lower-ranking military in the field to the insurgents' side, an increase in the number of desertions generally, or a precipitous rise in casualty figures.

o Infighting between senior generals over basic issues affecting the AFP or the country, leading to coup or preemptive coup plotting.

o Unhappiness among middle and junior grade officers over corruption and ineffectiveness in the general officer corps, leading to the organization of secret alliances across field commands and possible coup plotting.

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II. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)

The CPP's current organization is strong enough to manipulate and exploit events, but it cannot yet by itself create

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a revolutionary situation in which it could seize power. Its approach is to take over by stimulating political chaos through a dual strategy of armed struggle and political subversion. Although it is prudent, the CPP has been making gains rapidly. Two years ago the CPP hoped to move from a defensive, organizational phase to an offensive strategy in the late 1980s; following the public revulsion over Aquino's assassination the party accelerated its programs. The CPP is pressing its objectives through two groups:

- o The National Democratic Front (NDF) is responsible for setting up Communist cells in cities and towns, penetrating legal opposition groups, and organizing and exploiting anti-regime demonstrations and riots.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] we are still unable to assess the NDF's actual strength and were surprised at its success in exploiting the demonstrations that followed Aquino's assassination. We now suspect that the NDF is further ahead in achieving its organizational goals [REDACTED]

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- o The New People's Army (NPA) continues to make gains in the countryside through its guerrilla warfare activities. Its strength is reported at 7,000 armed regulars complemented by 14,000 active supporters. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] about one out of every five rural villages is now under

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some form of Communist influence, a significant increase over the past two years. [REDACTED]

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The Scenarios: The CPP is unable to seize power in the short term. For the time being, it probably prefers to see Marcos's rule perpetuated, its calculus being that this will lead to a further erosion of the power of the ruling elite, continued fragmentation of the moderate opposition, and an accelerated polarization of political forces. It will continue to position itself for an eventual takeover through guerrilla insurgency in the countryside combined with strong urban organization in a context of growing political chaos. [REDACTED]

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The CPP is likely to become stronger still and in two to three years may be organized enough to mount a serious takeover campaign (whether Marcos remains in office or not) in the event of the following potential developments:

- o Continued political and economic crisis.
- o The neutralization of the AFP as a countervailing force as a result of internal dissension, demands stemming from the need to maintain public security, or military defeat in the countryside.
- o The inability of the moderate opposition to unify, provide a strong political leader, or otherwise offer a viable political alternative.
- o The failure of the electoral system to provide a popularly acceptable means of changing governments. [REDACTED]

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US interests clearly would be seriously damaged in any scenario that saw the Communists either seize power or gain a

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prominent position in a coalition. In addition to anti-US foreign policies, the Communists would likely press for nationalization of US-owned companies and the ouster of the US bases. [REDACTED]

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Indicators of Developing Scenarios

- o Ability of the NDF to exploit worsening economic conditions, which might include new rounds of inflation and unemployment and consequent widespread strikes and street violence.

- o Increasing public acceptance of the NDF as a legitimate political alternative, especially by those who previously considered themselves moderates.

- o Success of NDF-backed candidates in local and national elections.

- o Failure of the government to implement an effective land reform program, control commodity prices, or otherwise provide adequate goods, services, and protection in rural areas.

- o Continued NPA military and organizational successes, including more frequent guerrilla-initiated armed encounters and support for the NPA by a growing portion of the rural population.

- o Massive NDF-led demonstrations which the military fails to or will not contain. [REDACTED]

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Pakistan: Scenarios for Dramatic Political ChangeSummary

President Zia's hold on power rests on continued military support and the inability of Pakistan's ethnic, religious, and political factions to act jointly against him. If Zia is ousted, this will most likely be done by the Army high command. It also is conceivable, though, that in differing conditions a center-left political coalition or Islamic fundamentalists could gain power. The country could easily be plunged into a period of prolonged chaos.

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The Present Scene

Pakistan is a collection of disparate ethnic groupings and religious affiliations that make national unity difficult to achieve. Having veered several times in its brief history between democratic and military rule, the country still lacks political institutions accepted as legitimate by a majority of the population. Stability depends not on a broadly based sense of national cohesion but on a diversity that makes it difficult for any political group to construct a national as opposed to a sectional base. Every national government has had to give top priority to combating secessionist tendencies or sectarian unrest threatening Pakistan's existence as a nation.

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For the present, a professional, highly trained and well-led military--supplemented by the bureauacracy and backed by conservative religious groups--holds the country together. A

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currently healthy economy is of further aid. Nevertheless, President Zia is plagued by sporadic sectarian violence in Sind province that could spill over into Punjab where he derives his principal support. Secessionism by non-Punjabi ethnic groups remains an ever-present danger. Civilian politicians of all political persuasions are pressing him to move more rapidly in reinstituting democratic processes. Indian and Soviet interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs and the presence of large numbers of Afghanistan refugees add further to his problems. Meanwhile, Zia rules with the support of the military and through a negative consensus that finds no other leader acceptable to a majority of the populace.

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Groups Capable of Seizing Power

The Military. A seizure of power by elements in the military--Pakistan has been under martial law since 1977--is not only possible but probable under certain conditions. The military sees itself as the only institution capable of preserving unity and sustaining development. The Army in particular has a strong esprit de corps, its chain of command is well tried and hierarchical, and it is unified. The military, moreover, is comfortable in its martial law role and distrusts political parties as promoters of divisive sectional interests. Some senior officers, however, believe that a return to civilian rule--under a framework that recognizes the primacy of the military as guardians of national unity--is essential to prevent further unrest which they believe would benefit only radicals.

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The Center-Left. Zia's chief opposition, the eight-party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), is factionalized and lacks broad popular support. Nevertheless, the MRD's main component--the Pakistan People's Party--is strong in rural Sind province and retains substantial support in rural areas and cities in the Punjab. For the present, neither the MRD nor the PPP is strong enough to mount a successful extralegal takeover attempt against the military. MRD or PPP provocation of popular unrest, however, could create conditions that would lead the military to oust Zia and return the country to constitutional government. The MRD arguably could win a fair popular election if it could unite behind a single slate of candidates. []

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The Muslims. Sunnis constitute the vast majority of the population, but Shias--who account for about 16 percent--are also politically significant. Further divisions within both sects are between modernizers and traditionalists, and between reformists and fundamentalists. All of these groups adhere to still further splintered historical and legal schools. Unlike Iran, Pakistan lacks a semblance of a single religious establishment subject to capture and use as a power base by an ambitious leader. Islamic leaders exert considerable political influence only at a local and sectarian level. At present, most Muslim groups support Zia--if often tacitly and unenthusiastically--because they fear that his ouster would pave the way for a leftist PPP-type government

and the subsequent reversal of Zia's Islamization policies. The principal groups are:

- o Jama' at-i-Islami (JI), a small, well-organized and funded fundamentalist party which has support among students, merchants, and the professional class. Lacking the popular support necessary to win elections, the JI is concentrating on penetrating influential labor and professional groups. Its student wing employs violence and aggressive tactics to dominate student politics at several key universities. [REDACTED]

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- o Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Pakistan (JUP) These two main Sunni parties are indecisive and lack cohesion. Both publicly oppose Zia, albeit tepidly. The JUP--the larger of the two--in particular is poorly organized, and its opportunistic leadership does not necessarily reflect the attitudes of local clerics, many of whom support Zia because of his Islamization policies. [REDACTED]

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- o The Shias, who are skeptical of Zia's policies on Islamization out of fear that their interests could suffer because of Sunni influence. They are better organized and more volatile than the Sunnis. [REDACTED]

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The Violent Left. Al-Zulfikar, a terrorist organization that was founded by former Prime Minister Bhutto's two sons and operates from exile, seeks to overthrow Zia and avenge Bhutto's execution. It draws its approximately 1,600 members chiefly from the urban poor. Zia has exploited Al-Zulfikar's foreign ties--to India and the Soviets--to discredit the group with most

Pakistanis, and it has little potential to seriously challenge the regime itself. Increased terrorist activities, however, could help promote a breakdown of law and order which the MRD and PPP could exploit. [REDACTED]

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Bit Players. Several lesser groups could be mobilized in one or more unfolding scenarios, but, on their own, they are too weak to pose a takeover threat.

- o All major parties have student wings on the various university campuses.

- o Organized labor is quiescent and apolitical but has been politically active in the past and could become active again if economic conditions deteriorate. It comprises less than 5 percent of the total labor force.

- o Small, elitist liberal women's groups associated with the MRD and lacking popular backing have attracted international attention and embarrassed Zia.

- o Lawyers, who have a tradition of political activism and influence beyond their number, generally oppose Zia's expansion of religious and military courts.

- o Conservative tribal chiefs in Baluchistan and NWFP support the splintered Muslim League. These chiefs want Zia to run for the Presidency but are not strong enough to provide him with a credible nationwide political base.

- o Bazaar merchants helped stimulate the unrest that led to Bhutto's ouster. While they generally support Zia, they could turn against him if the economy turns sour. [REDACTED]

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I. Scenario: Military Takeover

All previous coups have been conducted by a unified officer corps. Military officers generally adhere to the formal chain of command, and the armed forces have no history of renegade units even attempting a coup. We doubt the military will dissolve into battling factions, although we cannot discount coup plotting by junior officers discontented by the military's martial law responsibilities and attendant large-scale corruption. Zia would most likely be removed by senior officers who concluded collectively that Pakistan's security and territorial integrity were in imminent danger and that Zia's continuing presidency was contributing to the threat. [REDACTED]

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Pakistan governments traditionally have fallen when urban violence has become so widespread and intense that only the army could contain it. This level of violence could arise again as a consequence of a number of developments: confrontation between rival Muslim groups, anti-regime demonstrations by Muslim fundamentalists, violent demonstrations in favor of secession, violent attempts by political parties to force a return to civilian rule, and protests against a severe economic downturn that turned violent. The spread of terrorism by Al-Zulfikar and meddling by India and the Soviet Union could further raise the burner. In these circumstances, the Army high command plus most or all of the seven Army corps commanders might form a committee and take over from Zia more or less bloodlessly. [REDACTED]

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Indicators of Developing Scenario:

- o Zia's inability or unwillingness to implement policies to assuage secessionist sentiments.
- o Zia's postponement or refusal to accelerate the return to a semblance of civilian rule.
- o Conversely, Zia's adoption of policies to mollify the MRD that anger the Muslim right.
- o Muslim rightwing political groups previously supportive of Zia publicly oppose the government.
- o Local Muslim leaders in the cities of the Punjab heed calls to confront Zia.
- o Bazaar merchants, clerics, and workers previously supportive of Zia join anti-regime demonstrations by students, lawyers, and professional women.
- o Renewed disturbances in Sind province marked by widespread violence and the increased need for army intervention require a redeployment of troops from other provinces.
- o Widespread violent protests in Punjab, especially in Lahore and Rawalpindi.
- o A major incident or series of military overreactions result in heavy civilian casualties and widespread popular revulsion.
- o Widespread violence results from renewed Shia-Sunni fighting.
- o Senior military officers become unwilling to suppress anti-government demonstrations, particularly in Punjab.
- o Senior military generals attempt to bypass Zia and make

contact with civilian political leaders. [REDACTED]

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II. Takeover Attempt by Rightwing/Fundamentalist Muslim Groups

Zia would face a serious threat if the various rightwing/fundamentalist Muslim parties decided to replace him with an Iranian-style theocracy, another conservative military leader more amenable to their wishes, or a new civilian democracy. While these groups have crucially assisted Zia in tamping down popular unrest, especially in key cities where they have been an important counterweight to alienated interest groups, their support is of the fairweather variety only. Still we doubt that the Islamicists will soon turn against Zia and, if they did, that they could take over from him or orchestrate his demise. Before this could happen a number of unlikely developments would need to occur in tandem: Zia would have to adopt policies sufficiently anti-Islamic and supportive of the left to enrage the Muslims; a traumatic breakdown of traditional social values and the economy would have to occur and impel large numbers of Muslims into the embrace of a single school of Islamic fundamentalism; and third, a powerful, charismatic, Khomeini-like leader would have to emerge and organize a political movement able to exploit the situation. [REDACTED]

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A more likely scenario is for key Muslim interest groups to withdraw their support of Zia and work for an early return to civilian rule. This could result from a variety of simultaneous developments, including Zia's reversal of his pro-Islamic policies, a public mood shift in favor of more rapid

Islamization, economic deterioration that alienates the staunchly conservative Muslim bazaar merchants, Zia's indefinite postponement of the return to civilian rule, and US policies that lead Pakistani Muslims to attack Zia because of his ties to the United States. [REDACTED]

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Indicators of Developing Scenario

- o Zia is unable to quell leftist-instigated violence or prevent it from spreading.
- o Zia gives in to demands from center-left opposition parties, heightening their prospects for winning an election and forming a government.
- o Zia pursues modernization policies that over time result in social displacement and the breakup of traditional ways of life.
- o Bazaar merchants complain publicly about bureaucratic and military corruption, regulations that impede their ability to expand, or other economic policies adverse to their interests.
- o Pictures of Khomeini appear in increasingly large numbers in homes, shops, and educational institutions.
- o The fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) party decides to confront the regime by demonstrating in Karachi and Lahore for a more rapid return to civilian rule and more rapid Islamization.
- o The JI demonstrations are joined by normally rival sectarian groups.
- o The JI extends its penetration of labor unions and steps up its recruitment of students.
- o Rightwing and fundamentalist Muslim leaders engage in

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secret talks with senior generals behind Zia's back.

- o Fundamentalist Islamic teachings begin to attract adherents among junior officers and enlisted men.

- o A rural-based "pir" or religious leader begins to build a wide personal following which spreads to urban areas. [REDACTED]

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III. Takeover by a Center-Left Mass Movement

The group that poses the greatest danger to the regime is not the extreme left--Marxism has no mass appeal in Pakistan--but a centrist coalition having some leftist elements. Attempts by the MRD to forge such a movement so far have failed because the majority of the populace is not prepared to sacrifice economic stability simply to return to power political leaders that they have long distrusted. Moreover, the smaller constituent parties in the MRD remain deeply suspicious of the dominant PPP while moderates are reluctant to back a popular movement that would give radicals an opportunity to manipulate street mobs and could encourage land reform. [REDACTED]

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The preconditions necessary to convert the MRD into a genuine mass movement are not present. Such a movement could coalesce rapidly and make a grab for power with little warning, however, particularly if the economy deteriorates dramatically, Zia postpones elections or is otherwise unable to stay ahead of popular demands for a return to civilian government, opposition to military rule spreads to groups previously supportive of the regime, or a single overriding issue--for example, the pace and

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consequences of Islamization--captures the public's imagination. The most likely leader of such a movement would be a powerful, charismatic figure, perhaps one of the Bhutto women or a popular general having populist beliefs and ambitions of his own. To be successful, the movement would need to attract significant popular support in Punjab Province. []

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The mass movement might come to power either through an electoral victory or if the military felt compelled to step aside following a rising tide of popular unrest. In both instances the military would attempt to negotiate with the new government to retain at least a tacit veto over major foreign and domestic policies. If the military succeeded in these objectives, Pakistan would enjoy a period of relative political stability; if it did not succeed and its vital interests then came under assault, military leaders would soon start plotting to seize power or to oust the new government in favor of one more tractable to military demands. This development would lead to further instability and violence. []

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Indicators of Developing Scenario

- o Economic deterioration that adversely affects much of the population, including the professional and middle classes, bazaaris, and workers.
- o Large-scale public protests calling for an accelerated return to civilian rule.
- o Widespread protests against military rule by students who move off campus and coalesce with other opposition groups.
- o Bazaaris, clerics, and workers join with lawyers,

professional women, and students in anti-regime protests.

- o Serious anti-regime protests spread to Punjab Province.
- o Escalating violence compels Zia to postpone the elections.
- o The MRD's populist and Islamic socialist rhetoric begins to catch fire with a large part of the population.
- o The regime is unable to coopt the MRD leaders.
- o The MRD begins to unify around a single dominant issue; influential Punjabi groups begin to offer support.
- o The MRD starts to attract support from elements in the military.
- o Emergence of a charismatic leader.

IV. National Disintegration Caused by Widespread Secessionist and Sectarian Fighting

The three previous scenarios have focused on groups that could grab for power given certain conditions. This scenario focuses on a believable set of conditions that could foster long-term instability and be exploited by a variety of actors. []

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Separatism and sectarianism are the most serious long term threats to Pakistan. Only the Punjabis--who constitute more than half of the population and dominate the military, the bureaucracy and the economy--believe strongly in the concept of a singular Pakistani nationalism. The other major ethnic groups--Sindhis, Pathans, and Baluchs--all contain elements favoring autonomy or secession who are prepared to pursue these objectives by violent means. The only thread that may bind these diverse groups

together and deter them is the realization that any dismemberment of Pakistan could lead to the seizure of the breakaway components by neighboring India, Iran, and Afghanistan. []

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Further sectarian and ethnic conflict is inevitable; the only uncertainty is the intensity and scope of the fighting and whether it can be contained. Prolonged, bloody, and widespread fighting could so embitter the various protagonists against the government and each other that public order could only be maintained by harsh military rule and not by consensus. Certainly a return to civilian government would not be feasible for a long time. The consequences would be long-term instability and violence with the radical left or the fundamentalist right the biggest gainers. Prospects for meddling by Iran and the Soviet Union also would be immeasurably enhanced. India probably does not have territorial ambitions beyond Kashmir and does not seek to break up Pakistan; rather its goal is to get rid of Zia and see him replaced by a leader willing to recognize India's regional dominance. []

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An upsurge in secessionist sectarian conflict could be stimulated by a range of developments including: Zia's failure to rein in Punjabi assertiveness or introduce measures giving non-Punjabis a greater role in the military, the bureauacracy, and the economy; Soviet, Indian, or Iranian machinations that inflame both secessionist and sectarian sentiments; the conclusion by Shia Muslims that they have nothing to gain under military rule and nothing to lose by confronting it violently; Sunni alarm at Shi'ite activities leading the Sunnis to take to

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the streets.

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Indicators of Developing Scenarios

- o Punjabi administrators in Baluchistan, Sind, and Northwest Frontier provinces continue policies that are discriminatory or inimical to local customs.
- o Political parties representative of secessionist or sectarian interests are allowed to participate in the political arena.
- o Iranian subversives become increasingly active among Shias and Baluchistan secessionists.
- o India steps up its encouragement and support of Al-Zulfikar terrorists or Sindhi secessionists.
- o The Soviets increase efforts to promote Pushtun and Baluch separatism in order to divert Zia from aiding the insurgency in Afghanistan.
- o The "Sindhudesh" (Free Sind) movement begins to attract support from a wide range of Sindhis--particularly rural landlords--in addition to students.
- o Refugees from Afghanistan become involved in domestic Pakistani politics by supporting Zia, leading to increased tensions among secessionist groups in the NWFP.
- o One or more secessionist groups set up a "government-in-exile."
- o Secessionist guerrillas in Baluchistan step up attacks on government workers.
- o Renewed riots between Shia and Sunni mobs break out in

Karachi and other major cities.

o Widespread urban and rural violence occurs simultaneously in a number of provinces. []

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Implications for the United States

The replacement of Zia by another conservative general would not result in major policy changes affecting US interests--the change of government being personal rather than systemic--except if US policies were thought to have helped precipitate violence that preceded the takeover. []

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A regime formed by the Islamic right would remain committed to opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan and resisting India's regional ambitions. It would assume an even closer relationship with the Muslim world and seek to curb Western cultural influence, however; it probably also would de-emphasize relations with the United States, although probably not to the extent of refusing US economic and military aid. We doubt that such a regime would be as extremist as the Khomeini leadership in Iran. []

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US-Pakistani relations also would be impaired if a leftist-dominated mass movement seized power. Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan probably would be reversed, the regime in Kabul would be recognized, aid would be sought from the Soviet Union, ties with the United States would be downgraded, the Pakistani military would be weakened, and Indian regional hegemony might be accepted. If the movement that came to power was led by moderates, however, the military probably would be able to

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protect the US-Pakistani relationship in negotiations with the
new government, in which case the relationship in essence would
remain unchanged.

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